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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals is proper 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution 
giving the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction as provided 
by statute, Section 78-2-2(3)(i) granting the Supreme Court 
jurisdiction over all orders, judgments and decrees of any 
court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction, and Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) 
granting the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over all 
cases transferred from the Supreme Court. 
This is a contract action originally filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
(R-002). Pursuant to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R-042), the lower court granted Summary Judgment in favor of 
Defendants, and issued a Memorandum Decision on August 7, 
1987 (R-107-110). On August 27, 1987, the lower court 
entered its Findings of Uncontroverted Facts, Conclusions of 
Law, and Summary Judgment against Plaintiff (R-lll-114). 
Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal in the Supreme Court on 
September 24, 1987 (R-115). On December 3, 1987, the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court sent notice to counsel that Appellant's 
appeal had been directed to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
disposition. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Where an insured in good faith is negotiating 
a settlement of claims arising under or relating to an 
insurance policy, do such negotiations properly toll the 
contractual limitations period for the filing of a lawsuit, 
until such time as such negotiations are terminated, in order 
to further public policy that settlement be encouraged? 
2. Did the lower court record present a question 
of fact as to whether negotiations were on-going, thereby 
tolling the contractual limitations? 
3. Did Respondent waive the affirmative defense 
of the contractual limitations period by failing to raise 
such an issue as an affirmative defense in its Answer and by 
its failure to raise such a defense until after discovery was 
nearly completed and the case almost ready for trial? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
This action does not involve any constitutional or 
statutory provisions, ordinances or rules, but rather is 
premised upon common law rules of contract as set forth in 
the cases listed in Appellant's Table of Authorities. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action originally filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on November 14, 1986 (R-002). Thereafter, and subsequent to 
partial discovery in the matter, Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Leave to Amend Complaint (R-044), and Defendant filed a 
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Motion for Summary Judgment (R-042), which Motions were heard 
July 23, 1987 (R-053). Thereafter, the lower court granted 
Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants, and issued a 
memorandum decision ruling against Plaintiff on August 7, 
1987 (R-107 - 110). On August 27, 1987, the court entered 
its Findings of Uncontroverted Facts, Conclusions of Law, and 
Summary Judgment against Plaintiff (R-lll - 114). The Notice 
of Appeal was filed in the Supreme Court on September 24, 
1987 (R-115), and was subsequently assigned by the Clerk of 
the Court to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant acquired a business policy of insurance 
from Respondent State Farm Insurance Company (hereinafter 
"State Farm") on January 3, 1984, concerning premises owned 
by the Appellant. (Affidavit of John G. Hedman (R-074); 
Findings of Uncontroverted Fact R-lll). 
During the course of application for such 
insurance Appellant, through its agent John G. Hedman, 
informed State Farm, through its agent, Respondent Richard 
Webb (hereinafter "Webb"), that insurance was desired for 
potential losses in connection with the Creekview Apartments. 
Among the losses specifically requested to be covered, were 
losses relating to the loss of income resulting from fire or 
other damage to such premises. (Complaint, R-004; Affidavit 
of John G. Hedman, R-075.) 
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During the application process, State Farm, by and 
through its agent Webb, confirmed to Hedman that such 
insurance would be part of the insurance policy to be 
supplied by State Farm. (Affidavit of John G. Hedman; 
R-074) . 
On or about January 3, 1984, State Farm issued a 
Business Policy of Insurance (hereinafter "Policy11) , Policy 
No* 94-03-8792-2 (Policy No. 94-03-8792-2 [R-023 - 038]; 
Findings of Uncontroverted Fact [R-lll]). The Policy 
contains a provision that suit against State Farm must be 
filed within one (1) year of the loss. Said provision is 
quoted as follows: 
Suit. No action shall be brought unless there has 
been compliance with the policy provisions, and the 
loss has become payable as specified in condition 7 
— Payment of Loss and the action is started within 
one year after the occurrence causing loss or 
damage. (R-030) 
On July 25, 1985, a fire occurred at the Creekview 
Apartments. (Affidavit of John G. Hedman, [R-075]; 
Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment [R-017]). Pursuant to such fire, 
Appellant sustained a loss of rental income and use of the 
apartments in the amount of Ninety-Three Thousand Dollars 
($93,000.00) (R-075). During the time of the fire, the 
aforementioned Policy was in full force and effect. 
On or about January 28, 1986, Appellant filed a 
claim with State Farm to justify its entitlement to damages 
- 4 -
(R-076, 112). On or about March 7, 1986, and approximately 
four and one-half (4 1/2) months prior to the expiration of 
the one year provision specified above, State Farm denied 
Appellant's claim (R-112). 
On or about June 27, 1986 (eleven [11] months after 
the fire), Appellant's counsel submitted a formal complaint 
from such denial to the Utah State Department of Insurance 
(R-070, 077). 
During the time following the fire, and on many 
occasions after July 25, 1986, Appellant and its counsel 
negotiated with State Farm and its agent for settlement of 
the claim submitted by the Appellant (R-071). Such 
negotiations did not reach a settlement. 
However, pursuant to such negotiations, State 
Farm's agent Webb stated that he would resubmit the 
Appellant's claim to Respondent for reconsideration after the 
denial of the claim by State Farm (R-077). Pursuant to such 
reconsideration, on or about September 29, 1986, State Farm 
denied reconsideration of Appellant's claim (R-077; R-088). 
By virtue of a letter dated September 30, 1986, the 
State Department of Insurance notified Appellant's counsel 
that it was denying any further administrative action on 
Appellant's written complaint to that Department (R-089). 
On or about November 14, 1986, slightly more than 
one (1) month after the denial of further action by the State 
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Department of Insurance and shortly after final denial by 
State Farm, Appellant filed suit to recover damages under the 
terms of the Policy (R-002 - 005). No affirmative defense 
was raised in State Farm's Answer alleging failure to file 
the action within the one-year limitations period contained 
within the Policy (R-008 - 010). 
Depositions were taken and written discovery 
engaged in, and State Farm subsequently filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, alleging that the claim was barred by 
virtue of the limitations of the Policy (R-018 - 020). On or 
about August 7, 1987, the Third Judicial District Court 
issued a memorandum decision ruling in favor of Defendant 
State Farm and against Appellant on Appellant's claim for 
relief under the provisions of the Business Policy. (R-107 -
110) . 
On or about August 27, 1987, the Third Judicial 
District Court entered its findings of Uncontroverted Facts, 
Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment against Appellant on 
its claims arising under the Business Insurance Policy 
Contract (R-lll - 114). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Significant conflict as to the existence and nature 
of certain settlement negotiations existed at the time 
Summary Judgment was granted. When viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Appellant, the facts are in such obvious and 
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irreconcilable dispute that Summary Judgment was patently 
improper. Assuming, arguendo, that the lower court properly 
found no genuine issue as to the material facts, judgment 
still was not proper as a matter of law. 
The law in Utah reflects that there is a judicial 
abhorrence to contractually shortened limitations periods 
which differ from the prescribed statute of limitations of 
six years. Although such provisions are enforceable, they 
are usually disallowed where their application would be 
unreasonable under the circumstances. In the case at bar, 
State Farm, by the acts of its agent, Richard Webb, 
encouraged a resubmission of Appellant's claim which led 
Appellant to believe that its claims may yet be favorably 
resolved. By such actions, State Farm further induced the 
Appellant into a belief that a resort to legal action was yet 
unnecessary. Allowing State Farm to assert the defense of a 
contractual limitations period would not only be unreasonable 
under the circumstances, but would promote and inequitable 
result under prior law. 
Even if Summary Judgment was not precluded as a 
matter of law, the existence of a genuine issue of material 
fact precluded an entry of Summary Judgment. Appellant has 
provided the lower court with sworn testimony by Affidavit, 
testifying to the existence of settlement negotiations both 
before and after the contractual limitations period. The 
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lower court's dismissal of such testimony as conclusory is 
erroneous and constitutes reversible error. Such testimony 
complies in all respects with the requirements of Rule 56(c), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which mandates that such 
Affidavits shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence. Such facts constitute competent testimony which 
is admissible at trial sufficient to present a genuine issue 
of material fact as to their sufficiency in tolling the 
contractual limitations period. Appellant is further 
entitled to a determination from the trier of fact as to the 
sufficiency of such settlement negotiations. 
Finally, State Farm's tardiness in asserting the 
contractual limitations defense has unduly prejudiced the 
Appellant and caused an incurrence of unnecessary costs. Not 
only did the lower court allow the defense at a late date, 
but which also allowed State Farm to raise the defense in a 
manner and blatantly disregarded the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the procedural safeguards provided thereby. 
Consequently, Appellant was unduly prejudiced by the court 
allowing State Farm to raise such a defense on the grounds 
and under the assumption that the court would have granted 
its motion to amend had one been filed. State Farm's defense 
of contractual limitations was raised in a manner which 
completely disregards procedural safeguards and equitable 
opportunity for argument. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The Appellate Court Applies the Same Standard as the 
Below of an Order Granting Summary Judgment, 
Upon review by an appellate court of an order 
granting Summary Judgment in the court below, the appellate 
court applies the same standard as the trial court. Durham 
v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). That standard, as 
set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that ,f[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." 
The Supreme Court has recently held that "[a] 
motion for summary judgment can only be granted where there 
is 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,1 and 'even 
assuming the facts as asserted by the party moved against to 
be true, he could not prevail. f,f Gadd v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 
1041, 1043 (Utah 1984). It is only when the facts are 
undisputed and that one reasonable conclusion can be drawn 
therefrom that such issues become questions of law. 
F.M.A. Acceptance Co. v. Heatherby Insurance Co., 594 P.2d 
1332 (Utah 1979). The Court further articulated the rule in 
Mountain States Tel, and Tel, v. Atkin Wright & Miles, 
Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984): 
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Therefore, under Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P., 
summary judgment can be granted only if the record 
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Doubts, 
uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of 
fact must be construed in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing summary judgment . . . the trial 
court must not weigh evidence or assess 
credibility. 
Id. at 1261. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 
1983) . 
Thus, in reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment in the District Court, the appellate court similarly 
construes the evidence in a light most favorable to the party 
against whom the motion was granted and affirms only where, 
in that light, no genuine issue of material fact appears and 
the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter 
of law. Themy v. Segull Enterps.f Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 
19.79) . 
B. State Farm was not Entitled to Summary Judgment as a 
Matter of Law, Since Negotiations in Furtherance of 
Settlement Toll the Contractual Limitations Period in 
Furtherance of Public Policy. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court properly 
found no genuine issue as to any material fact in granting 
State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment, that court erred in 
ruling that State Farm was entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. Pursuant to the rule pronounced by the Supreme Court 
in Gadd v. Olson, supra, and Mountain States Tel, and Tel v. 
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Atkin, Wright and Miles, Chartered, supra, the lower court 
was obligated to view the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to Appellant, and 
with that view apply the law to those facts and inferences. 
Utah case law has established that "contractual 
limitations of the time in which to bring actions to enforce 
that contract are in derogation of the statutory six-year 
limitations on written instruments, and are looked upon with 
disfavor.11 See Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 
583 P.2d 101, 103 (Utah 1978); see also Hoeppner v. Utah Farm 
Bureau Insurance Co., 595 P.2d 863, 865 (Utah 1979). 
Although such contractual limitations are not prohibited, 
Anderson, 583 P.2d at 103, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
Notwithstanding the right to provide such 
limitations in insurance policies, their 
enforcement is not without limitation. By the same 
token that the law in the interest of justice and 
public policy imposes limitations upon other 
contract provisions, it is generally held that the 
insurance policies wiTl not be enforced if it is 
unreasonable under the circumstances so that it 
results in inequity or injustice. One of the 
reasons emphasizing the soundness of this rule is 
that the law by reason of statute allows an action 
to be brought on a written contract within six 
years, and this provision of the contract is in 
derogation of that right. 
Anderson v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty Co., 442 P.2d 933, 935 
(Utah 1968). (Emphasis added.) 
Consequently, in order that inequity not result 
from such limitations provision, the courts have created 
exceptions to these contractual limitations periods. They 
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are that (1) that the statute is suspended during 
negotiations until a denial of the claim is made by the 
insurer; and (2) if there are continued negotiations after 
the limitations period, the insured will have a reasonable 
time in which to file its action. 
a. Suspension of Limitations Period During 
Negotiations Until Claim is Denied. 
In Anderson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty, 583 
P.2d 101, 103 (Utah 1978) the Court held that "the better 
reasons cases hold that such [negotiating] actions on the 
part of the insured operates to suspend the running of the 
time during the period during the negotiations, and the 
insured is permitted a reasonable time in which to bring suit 
after termination of negotiations or denial of the claim by 
the insurer." This construction preserves the literal 
language of limitation provisions by providing that the 
insured will have adequate, albeit a shortened time, to 
present its claim, while not penalizing the insured for the 
time consumed by good faith negotiation effort, or delays 
caused by the insurer. 
Other jurisdictions have formalized this policy by 
holding that the plaintiff may file one year after a denial 
of the claim by the insurer. For example, in Clark v. Truck 
Insurance Exchange, 598 P.2d 628 (Nev. 1979) the court held 
that the contractual limitation 
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period will be tolled from the time appellant gave 
notice of the loss until respondent formally denies 
liability. This construction preserves the literal 
language of the limitation provision by providing 
that the insured will have only twelve months to 
institute a suit, but does not penalize the insured 
for the time consumed by the insurer while it 
pursues contractual rights to receive a proof of 
loss or negotiate payment with the insured. 
Id. at 629-630 (citations omitted); see also Davenport 
v. Republic Insurance Co., 625 P.2d 574 (Nev. 1981); 
Richard v. American Fellowship Mutual Insurance Co., 884 
Mich. App. 629, 270 N.W.2d 670 (1978). 
In the instant case, and as set forth in the 
statement of facts, Appellant utilized its limitations period 
by engaging in good-faith negotiations and appeals procedures 
in an attempt to resolve its claims without a resort to 
litigation. State Farm contends that the contractual 
limitations period, which is itself in violation of public 
policy, remains inviolate even during the pendency of such 
negotiations and appeals process. Such a conclusion is 
clearly contrary to the holding and spirit of Anderson v. 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., where the court held "[a]s 
defendant did not deny the claim, and continued the 
negotiations past the contractual limitations period, the 
defendant effectively waived its right thereunder and the 
court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the basis 
that it was not timely. Anderson, 583 P.2d at 103. 
In the case at bar, Appellant was assured by Mr. 
Webb, State Farm's agent, that the claim would be submitted 
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for reconsideration. Regardless of any previous denial, 
State Farm's own agent led Appellant to believe that State 
Farm would still scrutinize his claims. Appellant asserts 
that an agreement to resubmit the claim or reconsider the 
claim is a form of negotiations which would lead a reasonable 
person to believe that his claims may yet be paid without the 
need of litigation. 
In considering this contention below, the lower 
court argued for State Farm in drawing the analogy that a 
mere telephone call could then be construed to constitute 
negotiations for the purpose of tolling the statute. 
(Transcript of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Page 
13, Lines 13 - 12.) Clearly, however, a resubmission of the 
claim by the insurer's own agent is distinguishable from a 
telephone call from the insured. A telephone call from the 
insured or its counsel is instigated and accomplished by the 
insured and would be subject to abuse. However, a 
resubmission of a claim, by an insurance company's own agent, 
is not within the control of the insured. It is an act 
attributable solely to the company, which acts and assurances 
of resubmission caused the insured to believe that his claims 
were still being resolved. 
State Farm argues that a reconsideration of the 
claim never occurred. However, to an insured, who is not 
chargeable with a knowledge of company procedures or process 
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of appeal, a "resubmission of the claim" is or may be 
synonymous with a "reconsideration of the claim" and as such 
cause the same belief that his claim may yet be favorably 
resolved. State Farm seeks to split hairs with terms of 
process which are familiar only to the insurer and such fine 
line positions should not be determinative of what the 
insured was led to believe or whether, in fact, such 
resubmission constitutes a form of negotiation. The insured 
was led to believe that he had negotiated another 
"reconsideration" by having his claim "resubmitted" and as 
such, negotiations for the purpose of fulfilling public 
policy had occurred. Appellant was led to believe that his 
claim was in State Farm's hands and continued so to believe 
until receiving the final rejection letter dated 
September 29, 1986. 
When the law and facts are viewed in a light most 
favorable to Appellant, State Farm led Appellant to believe 
that its claims were still under consideration by 
resubmitting the claim and by the content of subsequent 
conversation. In a light most favorable to Appellant, such 
resubmission is a form of negotiation and when integrated 
with the public policy of allowing a reasonable time to 
assert claims, mandates that the contractual limitations be 
tolled. 
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State Farm would have this court adopt a position 
which would allow an insurer to encourage a resubmission of 
claim during the limitations period, causing the Appellant 
uncertainty as to his claims status, and then after the 
period has run claims that it was still relying upon a 
previous determination. In this way, an insurer could deter 
a claimant from instigating legal action during the pendency 
of the limitations period. Such a position is ill-advised 
and inequitable and Appellant urges this court to find that 
the statute was tolled until the final denial was issued by 
State Farm. 
b. Continued Negotiations After the Contractual 
Limitations Period has Expired Provide a Reasonable 
Time in Which to File a Claim. 
In the case at bar, State Farm had continued 
negotiations with the Defendant well past the alleged 
one-year date of limitation (R-071). It was not until 
Plaintiff received the letter dated September 29, 1986, that 
Plaintiff knew it had exhausted its hope for a settlement and 
that additional action would be necessary. Indeed, in 
Anderson v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty Co., 442 P.2d 933, 937 
(Utah 1968), the court recognized that "delay is often to the 
advantage of the insurance company and after making use of 
it, as it has a right to do, it should not be given nor take 
advantage of invoking a literal application of the 12-month 
limitation to the disadvantage of the insured." 
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In Richard v. American Fellowship Mutual Insurance 
Co., 884 Mich. App. 629, 270 N.W.2d 670 (1978), the court 
held: 
[i]f we were to accept defendant's interpretation 
of the statutory provision, we would in effect be 
penalizing the insured for the time the insurance 
company used to assess its liability. To bar the 
claimant from judicial enforcement of its insurance 
contract rights because the insurance company has 
unduly delayed in denying its liability would run 
counter to the legislative intent to provide the 
insured with prompt and adequate compensation. 
The Richard court adopted the ruling in Tom Thomas 
Organization, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 396 Mich. 588, 
591, 594, 242 N.W.2d 396, 397-98 (1976), where the court held 
that "the running of the period of limitations was tolled 
from the date Tom Thomas gave notice of loss until liability 
was formally denied by Reliance.11 This interpretation 
provides protection to the insured by providing that, because 
insurance companies will be "unable to profit from processing 
delays, insurance companies will be encouraged to promptly 
assess the liability and to notify the insured of their 
decision. At the same time, the insured will have a full 
year in which to bring suit." Richard, 270 N.W.2d at 673. 
Additionally, in Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bureau 
Insurance Co., 595 P.2d 863 (Utah 1979), the court held that 
where a plaintiff, as a matter of law, acts within a 
reasonable period of time in commencing its action under the 
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facts, assertion of a contractual limitations period is an 
insufficient basis on which to grant summary judgment. 
At hearing of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, counsel for State Farm sought to distinguish 
Hoeppner from the case at bar. In Hoeppner, the insured was 
never given a policy of insurance until after the contractual 
limitations period had expired. Counsel for State Farm 
argues that Hoeppner is inapplicable since Appellant herein 
had a copy of the insurance policy. (Transcript of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Page 5, Lines 23-25; 
Page 6, lines 1 - 24.) However, State Farm has misperceived 
the Court's holding in Hoeppner. The Court's holding was 
based upon the reasonableness of the insured's actions under 
the circumstances. The Court's holding was one premised upon 
equity under the circumstances. 
Appellant stresses that the same equitable 
principles are appropriate here, since its efforts were taken 
in good faith, and in all respects were reactions to the 
actions of State Farm and its agents. Consequently, since 
State Farm caused Appellant to believe that negotiations had 
continued until receipt of the September 29, 1986 letter, 
State Farm should be barred from capitalizing on its own 
delay and inducement, and Appellant should be allowed a 
reasonable time to file its Complaint. 
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C. Lower Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor 
of State Farm Since a Genuine Issue of Material Fact 
Existed With Regard to Whether Negotiations were Ongoing 
and as a Result, Tolled the Contractual Limitations 
Period. 
A key consideration in the lower court's grant of 
Summary Judgment in favor of State Farm was its decision that 
substantial negotiations sufficient to toll the statute had 
not occurred (R-113). Appellant contends now, as in the 
court below, that a determination as to whether the 
negotiations were ongoing or substantial was a question of 
fact upon which Appellant was entitled to go to the trier of 
fact. 
The lower court record contains sufficient evidence 
that the parties disputed a genuine issue of material fact. 
In the Affidavit of William G. Gibbs, Affiant stated as 
follows: 
Furthermore, Affiant had conversations with counsel 
and representatives of State Farm Insurance 
regarding settlement of Plaintiff's claim. 
Conversations occurred after July 25, 1986. At no 
time during such post-July 26, 1986, conversations 
with agents of Defendant State Farm Insurance 
Company, did any agent or representatives inform 
Affiant that the limitations period contained in 
the Policy of Insurance would be exercised. To the 
contrary, agents and representatives of Defendant 
State Farm Insurance continued to negotiate and 
discuss plaintiff's claim with Affiant after July 
26, 1986." 
(R-071). 
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The lower court found such testimony to be merely 
conclusory. (Transcript of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Page 14, Lines 8-9.) However, the court found 
that a lack of statements by State Farm indicating they were 
officially re-opening consideration to be determinative that 
there were no further negotiations. The Court's reliance 
upon the absence of statements by State Farm, while 
dismissing out of hand actual statements by and for Appellant 
was patently unreasonable. Aside from the fact that the 
lower court erroneously called an affirmative allegation of 
the existence of such conversations a "conclusion" while 
finding an absence of such statements from State Farm to be 
fact determinative, Appellant asserts that the statements 
contained within the Affidavit were independently sufficient 
to create a question of fact. The testimony of the Affidavit 
was not conclusory, but established the existence of 
settlement conversations. The issue is one of the weight to 
give such statements, and whether such conversations and 
meetings in fact constituted negotiation. When viewed in a 
light most favorable to Appellant, such conversations may 
have been sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. The 
Court below clearly and improperly weighed the evidence 
before it on Summary Judgment. 
In addition, in the Affidavit of John G. Hedman, 
the Affiant therein states: 
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During this period of time [June, 1986], Affiant 
continued to discuss his claim against State Farm 
Insurance with agent Richard Webb. Agent Richard 
Webb informed Affiant that he, Mr. Webb, was 
continuing to contact representatives of State Farm 
Insurance Company to see if the claims, or any 
portion thereof, would be allowed. During the 
following few months, Defendant Richard Webb 
informed Affiant that he would assist in presenting 
the claim again to State Farm Insurance for a 
reconsideration of the matter. Affiant also 
maintained contact directly with the State Farm 
claims department during this period of time. 
By virtue of a letter date September 29, 1986, 
agent Dick Webb wrote Affiant a letter notifying 
Affiant that State Farm Insurance was denying any 
reconsideration of the claim of the plaintiff. 
(R-079 - 078). 
Appellant has provided the court with Affidavits 
made upon personal knowledge, which Affidavits set forth 
facts which would be admissible in evidence, and which showed 
affirmatively that the Affiant was competent to testify as to 
the matter stated therein. Appellant has satisfied the 
standards set forth by Rule 56(e) by providing the court with 
competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing the 
ongoing nature of the negotiations. Any contentions by State 
Farm that such negotiations did not exist or were 
insubstantial merely raise questions of fact which are 
material to determining whether the statute of limitations 
should have been tolled under the decisions and policies 
previously set forth by this court. 
Consequently, the lower court erred in making its 
own determination of facts material to the tolling of the 
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contractual limitations period to which there was a bona fide 
dispute. 
D. State Farm Waived the Affirmative Defense of the 
Contractual Limitations Period by its Failure to Raise 
this Affirmative Defense in its Answer and by its 
Failure to Make Such Arguments Until After Discovery 
was Nearly Completed and the Case Ready for Trial 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that "in a pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively . . . statute of limitations 
. . . and any other matters constituting an avoidance of an 
affirmative defense.M In Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, it provides Ma party waives all defenses and 
objections which he does not present in his answer or reply 
•i 
. . . . 
The policy and provisions of the aforementioned 
rules have been routinely upheld by the Utah courts. In 
Staker v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 
(Utah 1983) the defendants sought to amend their answer to 
include the defense of a statute of limitations. The trial 
court denied the request and the Utah Supreme Court upheld 
the denial stating: 
Plaintiff, in going to the extent of discovery and 
preparing for trial, relied upon defendant's answer 
filed over two years prior to trial. Plaintiff 
pleaded in his case and responded to discovery with 
specificity setting forth all relevant facts, 
events and dates. The essential facts upon which 
the statute could have been asserted were known to 
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the defendant from the beginning. Defendant 
alleges no surprise, discovery of evidence relating 
to this defense, or other justification for his 
delay in asserting the statute of limitations. 
Plaintiff's case was not subject to the evidentiary 
difficulties that the statute of limitations are 
designed to prevent, such as lost evidence, faded 
memories and absent witnesses. . . .If the case is 
truly still, a motion to amend an answer to assert 
the statute of limitations may be granted. 
Id. at 1188 - 89. 
In the instant case, State Farm has known all of 
the facts necessary to plead the contractual limitations 
defense since the Complaint was filed. Instead, State Farm 
waited until after the Appellant had taken part in extensive 
discovery and the case was nearly ready for trial before 
raising this defense, and then doing so by way of Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Such actions are not only contrary to the 
express provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but 
also imposed an inequitable result upon the Appellant. 
Such inequity is further magnified by the procedure 
used by State Farm to interpose its contractual limitations 
defense. At no time did State Farm ever file a motion to 
amend its Answer, which action would be discretionary with 
the trial court. Instead, State Farm first raised its 
defense in its Motion for Summary Judgment and justified its 
assertion by the assumption that the trial court would have 
granted its motion to amend had such a motion been filed. 
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(Transcript of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Page 8, Line 12 - 25; Page 9, Lines 1 - 25; Page 10, Lines 
1 - 2.) State Farm concludes such an argument by stating 
that following the rules, is merely "putting procedure ahead 
of substance and it is simply circuitous and unnecessary 
. . .
ff
 (Transcript of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Page 9, Lines 24 - 25; Page 10, Lines 1-2.) 
Appellant arduously contends that the very essence 
of such procedural requirements is to safeguard the interests 
of opposing parties. By requiring an amendment to pleadings, 
or requiring notice of a motion to be sent to an opposing 
party, the system thereby allows the party against whom the 
motion is filed to prepare its arguments and defense to such 
a motion. In the instant case, all procedural safeguards 
were totally disregarded and Appellant was unduly prejudiced 
by the lower court's admission of such a defense in a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
To allow State Farm to disregard procedure 
safeguards would constitute a manifest injustice. Therefore, 
Appellant contends that the contractual limitations defense 
was not only waived by the failure to raise it in timely 
fashion, but was also untimely, improperly and unacceptably 
presented to the prejudice of the Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Order granting Summary Judgment and remand this 
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matter to the lower court for a determination of the issues 
before the trier of fact. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ day of 
February, 1988. 
ALLEN_NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
a J. v jjjc*y 
.lam G. Gibbs, Esq. 
Jruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Creekview Apartments 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ' day of February, 
1988, I caused to be served four (4) true and accurate copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Darwin C. Hansen, 
Esq., of HANSEN, CRIST & SPRATLEY, Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent, 110 West Cen£er^  Street, Bountiful, Utah 
84010. 
5514 
j V MJJH 
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A D D E N D U M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CREEKVIEW APARTMENTS, a Utah 
limited partnership, by and 
through its general partner 
HEDMAN INVESTMENTS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-86-8621 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing, 
at which time the Court took the matter under advisement. The 
Court has now reviewed the Memorandums filed by the defendant in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, the plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to the same, the Affidavits filed, and 
the cases cited and referred to, and rules as follows. 
Plaintiff acquired a policy of insurance from defendant on 
January 3, 1984 in regard to construction of premises located at 
948 East 7145 South, Suite 104, Midvale, Utah. The said policy 
contained conditions that required compliance with the terms and 
conditions of the policy before action could be brought and, 
furthermore, a condition that legal action must be commenced 
within one year after an occurrence causing a loss. The said 
provision is stated on page 15 of the exhibit (item 9) , as 
follows: 
Exhibit Mfe'' 
CREEKVIEW V. STATE FARM PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Suit. No action shall be brought unless there has been 
compliance with the policy provisions, and the loss has 
become payable as specified in Condition 7 - Payment of 
Loss and the action is started within one year after 
the occurrence causing loss or damage. 
The fire occurred on July 25, 1985 at a different address 
than the covered premises named in the policy (961-965 South 
Union, Midvale, Utah). 
The plaintiff filed its claim on January 28, 1986. 
The claim was denied by the defendant on March 7, 1986, some 
four and one-half months prior to expiration of the one year 
suit. This denial was by letter, with reasons given for the 
denial. 
Plaintiff filed suit on October 26, 1986, 15 months after 
the fire had occurred. 
Plaintiff has taken the position that because the insurance 
agent said he would resubmit the claim to the insurance company, 
that this constituted waiver as far as the one year limitation 
was concerned. Plaintiff admits there are no other facts upon 
which it can rely to claim waiver or estoppel by the insurance 
company. 
The one year condition set forth in the policy cannot be 
overcome by simply refiling claims after they have been 
previously denied by an insurance company. Otherwise, such 
provision would never be effective since anyone, at anytime, 
could simply renew a claim after having received a denial and do 
CREEKVIEW V. STATE FARM PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
so for the purpose of overcoming the said condition. The 
response from the insurance company was not a reconsideration, 
but a reaffirmation of its prior denial. 
Such conditions have been upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Insurance Co., 583 P.2d 101 (Utah 
1978) , and Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bureau. 595 P.2d 683 (Utah 
1979) . 
The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Counsel for defendant will prepare the appropriate Order. 
Dated this "~J day of August, 1987. 
LEONARD HJ RUSSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CREEKVIEW V. STATE FARM PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this ~[ day of August, 1987: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
215 S. State, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Darwin C. Hansen 
Attorney for Defendant 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
C< 7^i^,^ 
DARWIN C. HANSEN, #2058 
Attorney for Defendant 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 29 5-2391 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CREEKVIEW APARTMENTS, a Utah 
limited partnership, by and 
through its general partner 
HEDMAN INVESTMENTS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF UNCONTROVERTED 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-8621 
(Judge Leonard H. Russon) 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before 
the above-entitled Court on Thursday, the 23rd day of July, 19 87, 
pursuant to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Honorable LEONARD H. RUSSON, Judge presiding. 
Each party was represented by counsel of record. The 
Court heard the arguments of counsel, reviewed the file, 
Affidavits and Memorandums of Points and Authority, and now being 
fully advised in the premises, and pursuant to Rule 52(a), 
U.R.Civ. P., hereby makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF UNCONTROVERTED FACT 
1. Plaintiff acquired a business policy of insurance 
from Defendant on January 3, 1984, concerning premises located at 
948 East 7145 South, Suite 104, Midvale, Utah. 
exhibit *f\" 
2. The insurance policy contained provisions 
requiring compliance with its terms and conditions before any 
action could be brought against Defendant. 
3. Specifically, the policy provided that suit 
against Defendant must be filed within one year of the loss. 
Said provision is quoted as follows: 
Suit. No action shall be brought unless 
there has been compliance with the policy 
provisions, and the loss has become payable 
as specified in Condition 7 - Payment of 
Loss, and the action is started within one 
year after the occurrence causing loss or 
damage. 
4. A fire occurred July 15, 1985, at separate 
premises, to-wit: 961 - 965 South Union, Midvale, Utah, causing 
property damage. 
5. Plaintiff filed a claim with Defendant concerning 
said property damage on January 28, 19 86. 
6. Defendant denied the claim March 7, 1986, 
approximately four and one-half months prior to the expiration of 
the one year provision specified in paragraph 3 above. The 
denial was by letter stating the reasons. 
7. Plaintiff filed suit October 26, 1986, 
approximately fifteen months after the fire had occurred. 
8. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's retail agent 
said he would resubmit Plaintiff's claim to Defendant for 
reconsideration after the denial. 
9. Defendant affirmed the original denial following 
the agent's request for reconsideration. 
From the foregoing Findings of Uncontroverted Facts, 
the Court makes and enters the following; 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The one year provision contained in the subject 
insurance policy is valid and enforceable. See Anderson vs. 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 581 P.2d 101 (Utah, 1978) , 
and Hoeppner vs. Utah Farm Bureau, 595 P.2d 683 (Utahr 1979). 
2. The one year provision cannot be overcome by 
simply re-filing a claim after it has been previously denied by 
an insurance company. If such were the case, the contractual 
provision would have no effect because an insured could simply 
renew the claim after having received a denial and do so for the 
purpose of overcoming the one year provision. 
3. Defendant's reaffirmation of the original denial 
was not a reconsideration of Plaintiff's claim. 
4. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should 
be granted. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Uncontroverted 
Facts and Conclusions of Law, the Court makes and enters the 
following Judgment: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendant is granted a no-cause of action Summary Judgment in its 
favor and against Plaintiff, together with costs. 
DATED this day of August, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
LEQ/NARI7 H. RUSSON 
D i s t r i c t J u d g e 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the f ollowing-name;d\ individual via 
first-class mail, postage prepaid on this 1 / day of August, 
1987: 
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
Allen Nelson Hardy & Evans 
215 South State, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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William G. Gibbs (#1185) 
Bruce J. Nelson (#2380) 
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8400 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CREEKVIEW APARTMENTS, a Utah 
limited partnership, by and 
through its general partner 
HEDMAN INVESTMENTS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE FARM INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
WILLIAM G. GIBBS, being first duly sworn on oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant is one of the attorneys of record for the 
Plaintiff herein. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
"WILLIAM G. GIBBS 
Civil No. C86-8621 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
2. Affiant assisted the Plaintiff in negotiations with 
State Farm Insurance Company concerning the cause of action 
set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint. 
3. By letter dated June 27, 1986, Affiant forwarded to 
the State Department of Insurance a formal Complaint against 
State Farm Insurance Company relating to its denial of 
Plaintiff's claim. A copy of Affiant's letter of transmittal 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
4. Thereafter, Affiant had several conversations with 
the State Department of Insurance relating to such matter. 
Furthermore, Affiant had conversations with counsel and 
representatives of State Farm Insurance regarding settlement 
of Plaintiff's claim. Conversations occurred after July 25, 
1986. At no time during any such post-July 26, 1986, 
conversations with agents of Defendant State Farm Insurance 
Company, did any agent or representative inform Affiant that 
the limitation period contained in the policy of insurance 
would be exercised. To the contrary, agents and 
representatives of Defendant State Farm Insurance continued 
to negotiate and discuss Plaintiff's claim with Affiant after 
July 26, 1986. 
5. By a letter dated September 30, 1986, from Kendall 
R. Surfass from the State Department of Insurance, Affiant 
learned that the formal Complaint filed with the Department 
was being denied further administrative review. Thereafter, 
2 
Affiant's office began preparation of a formal judicial 
Complaint against Defendant State Farm Insurance Company and 
the Complaint was filed herein on October 26, 1986. 
DATED this ^TO^ day of July, 1987. 
A 4 !. Ut-rVnyp-u 
~7 
WILLIAM G. GIBBS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3 "3^ day of 
July, 1987. 
NOTARY PUBLIC , .-^x 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: S- JL- £- • 1/ 1/UT 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the ^ ^ day of July, 1987, I 
caused to be hand-delivered a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Affidavit of William G. Gibbs to Darwin C. Hansen, 
Attorney for Defendant, 110 West Center Street, Bountiful, 
Utah 84010. 
wdmdU-Vi^ 
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June 27, 1986 
Mr. Kenoall R. Surrass 
Statr Counsel 
Insurance Department 
P.O. Box 45303 
Salt La*e City, Utah 84145 
Dear Mr. Surrass: 
Enclosed please tmd the Complaint of Hedman 
InvestraentSr Inc., oy Jonn Hedman. 
Mr. Hedman complains that State Farm wrongfully denied 
ftis claim for loss of income resulting from a tire tnat 
destroyed one or nis apartment Duiidmgs. 
I have also enclosed a memorandum outlining tne legal 
tneories applicaoie co Mr. Heaman's complaint. Tne memorandum 
is coni:identiaif so I asK tnat it not oe disclosed co State 
Farm at cms time. 
Ir I can oe oi any assistance to you on tnis matcer, 
please don't nesitate to cail. 
Very truly yours, 
William G. GIODS 
WGGrm 
enc. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
